

EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY IN ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS.

In the program for this Conference, which was sent out about a month ago, the first subject listed for discussion is "Efficiency and Economy in Administration of Federal Reserve Banks". This subject, always an important one, has added significance at this time because of charges which have been given wide circulation and publicity that there has been an amazing waste of public money in the increase of salaries and in the expenditures of the Federal Reserve Banks. These charges are, no doubt, responsible for the resolution recently adopted by the United States Senate, directing the Federal Reserve Board to inform the Senate of the number of officers and employees, together with their respective salaries, of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as of the other Federal Reserve Banks, and the expenditures made by each "Branch Bank" in the erection of public buildings and the general expenses in the administration of each Federal Reserve Bank, and how much of the net earnings have been paid to the United States as a franchise tax.

In the opinion of the Board it is unfortunate that matters of this kind should assume a political aspect or that they should become the subject of a Congressional resolution. The Board has kept Congress informed of these matters ever since the Banks were organized late in the year 1914. In each Annual Report information regarding salaries has been given in detail, names only being omitted. An exhibit has been made for each Federal Reserve Bank, showing the number of officers by grades,

salaries paid to each, the total number of employees, the average salary and the aggregate of all salaries paid. Information equally explicit has been given from year to year regarding the building operations of the several Federal Reserve Banks. The Board has endeavored to make clear the character and functions of the Federal Reserve Banks and to distinguish between matters which come under the supervision and control of the respective boards of directors and under the general supervision of the Federal Reserve Board.

For some time past, a persistent propaganda has been conducted, which is calculated to mislead the public and which apparently is designed to bring the System and its management into disrepute. The powers and duties of the directors of Federal Reserve Banks are defined in Section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act. Responsibility for the management of these Banks rests primarily and directly upon them and upon their duly appointed officers and agents. The law requires that any compensation that may be provided by boards of directors for directors, officers or employees shall be subject to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. The Board has not in all cases approved salaries which have been voted by directors of Federal Reserve Banks, but as a rule the recommendations of the directors with respect to salaries have been approved by the Board, sometimes, perhaps, with some reluctance.

The Board has taken the position, however, that as the directors are primarily responsible for the administration of the Banks, much consideration should be given to their views as to the rate of compensation necessary to secure honest, efficient and careful management. In its Annual Report for the year 1918, the Board pointed out that particularly with respect to junior officers and employees salaries must be paid approximating

the salaries paid by large member banks in the cities where the Federal Reserve banks are located. If, in order to reduce expenses, the policy should be adopted of making the Federal Reserve banks mere training schools for bank officers, it is hardly possible, because of the frequent changes involved, that the banks would have the degree of efficiency in administration and smoothness of operation which they would have if the compensation paid be sufficiently liberal to retain the services of trained and capable men.

The Board does not for a moment believe that the directors of any Federal Reserve bank in fixing salaries or in authorizing expenditures in developing the business have been actuated by any desire to deprive the Government of the revenue which it is entitled to receive under the terms of Section 7 of the Federal Reserve Act, and most assuredly the Federal Reserve Board would not be a party to any such undertaking.

Federal Reserve banks are not, strictly speaking, Government institutions. The government owns no stock in them, they are not supported by appropriations made by Congress, they are subject to local taxation on their real estate just as national banks are and their payments out of earnings to the Government as a franchise tax at times greatly exceed all taxes paid by an equal number of the largest national banks, state banks and trust companies in the United States. The directors of Federal Reserve banks are given such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking within the limitations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Act

and "shall perform the duties usually appertaining to the office of directors of banking associations and all such duties as are prescribed by law".

There can be no question, therefore, as to the authority of directors of Federal reserve banks to provide their institutions with suitable banking quarters. As has been repeatedly pointed out to Congress, it has been impossible to lease adequate quarters, and building operations have, therefore, become necessary. The Senate resolution, to which allusion has been made, refers to the Federal reserve banks as "branches". The Federal Reserve Act, however, makes it very plain that these banks are not branches. Their independent powers are defined in Section 4 and authority to establish branches of their own is given them in Section 3.

The buildings acquired or constructed by Federal reserve banks are in no sense public buildings. The funds necessary for their acquisition or construction were not appropriated by Congress, the title is not vested in the United States but in the Federal reserve bank, and they are not exempt from taxation as all public buildings are, but are expressly made liable to state and local taxation. The officers of Federal reserve banks are not officers of the United States, and are not public officials any more than officers of national banks are public officials. Federal reserve banks, like national banks, are organized under the laws of the United States and each are supervised by public officials; the Federal reserve banks by the Federal Reserve Board and the national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency.

Both classes are impressed with duties to the public, but it is true that Federal reserve banks, by reason of their supervisory powers over the member banks and the nature of their business, and by reason of the elimination of the element of competition, have more of the attributes of governmental institutions than national banks.

In order to render efficient service to the member banks and through them to the public and to perform the functions imposed upon them by the Act, Federal reserve banks are obliged to make large expenditures which are not imposed upon national banks, state banks and trust companies.

The Board does not wish to impair in any degree the efficiency of the Federal reserve banks, but deems it important, nevertheless, to call your attention to the reaction which has taken place during the past eighteen months, to the general business depression now prevailing throughout the country, to the smaller volume of earning assets now carried by the Federal reserve banks and the consequent reduction in the earnings, and to the change in public sentiment with regard to large expenditures.

The Board urges you, therefore, to do all in your power to eliminate unnecessary expense and to conduct the business of your respective institutions in such a manner as to give no reasonable grounds for any charge of extravagance and waste.

Recent Developments in the Par Clearance System and
Suggested Changes in Methods.

The Board desires to call your attention to the persistent opposition on the part of a large number of non-member banks of the country to the Federal reserve par clearance system and to the impediments which have been thrown in the way of making this system universal in its scope.

The injunction which was obtained some eighteen months ago by the state banks in Georgia against the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is still in effect. The Federal reserve bank was successful in removing the case from the state court to the United States District Court and won a clear cut decision in that court. It won also in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, but the decision of the United States Supreme Court was to the effect that if the allegations made by the complainants could be sustained they would be entitled to relief. By reason of the language used in the opinion of the Supreme Court this decision has been represented to the public as a sweeping victory for the complainants and as a condemnation by the highest court of the land of the policy of the Federal reserve banks with respect to collections.

As a matter of fact, however, the case has merely been remanded to the United States District Court in Georgia for trial on its merits, and a favorable outcome is anticipated by the bank's Counsel, with whom is associated Hon. John W. Davis, former Solicitor General of the United States and more recently United States Ambassador to Great Britain. This case will doubtless come again before the Supreme Court of the United States in regular course after it has been decided by the United States District Court and the United States ^{Circuit} Court of Appeals.

It is necessary, however, to call your attention to the fact that the legislatures of the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida and North Carolina have enacted laws which will make it difficult, if not impossible, to oblige non-member banks to remit at par, and while there is doubt as to the constitutionality of these laws, a separate test will have to be made in each instance.

This will involve great expense and perhaps many years will elapse before all the cases can be decided finally.

It is not the purpose of the Board to recommend any immediate change in policy, for Counsel is anxious that nothing be done to confuse the issues as they have already been defined in the case now pending in the United States District Court in Georgia, but after that court has decided the case the Board may suggest a modification of the present plan. It seems opportune, therefore, to discuss this question on the present occasion and request the Federal Reserve Agents and Governors of the banks at their separate meetings to devote such time as may be necessary for a full discussion of this subject.

Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to exercise the functions of a clearing house for the Federal reserve banks or to designate a Federal reserve bank to exercise such functions, and also to require each such bank to exercise the functions of a clearing house for its member banks. In the development of the present system the Board has attempted to establish such a clearing house in each District.

In many of the large cities there are banks which are not members of the local clearing house, but which are permitted to use some clearing house member bank as a clearing agent. Such banks are, however, obliged to conform to all the rules and regulations which govern clearing house member banks. Non-member banks which refuse to remit at par for checks drawn on them have been availing themselves of the facilities of the Federal reserve par clearance system through their member bank correspondents. It has been suggested to the Board by the Governors of two Federal reserve banks that in view of the legislation in the states above named and of

possible similar legislation in other states, it would be well to take advantage of another provision in Section 16, which authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to fix the charge which may be imposed for the service of clearing or collection rendered by the Federal reserve bank, by authorizing Federal reserve banks to advise their member banks that on and after a certain date a compensatory charge of so much per one hundred dollars will be imposed against the member banks on all checks endorsed by or originating with a non-member bank whose name is not on the par list.

Under such a regulation non-member banks which refuse to lend their cooperation to the Federal reserve collection system would have to pay for the benefits derived by them from that collection system, for member banks would hardly be willing to collect checks for such non-member banks unless paid for doing so at rates equal to those charged by the Federal reserve banks.

The Board requests that the Governors and Federal Reserve Agents in their separate sessions discuss this proposition in all its bearings.

Principles Governing the Discount Rate.

Control over discount rates, as exercised by the Federal reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board, is one of the most important and far-reaching powers ever delegated by Congress to another instrumentality. The grant ranks with the power given the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroad rates. While it is necessary that powers of this kind should be vested in a few hands they should be used with discretion and the effect of a change in rate should be carefully considered before the change is made.

The principle is well established that in theory the Federal reserve bank discount rate should be slightly in excess of current rates. There has been much discussion of the reductions which have been made in discount rates during the last six months and disregarding opinions of the prejudiced and the uninformed, let us consider the conflicting views of some whose opinions are worthy of attention and respect. The quotations which follow are from a symposium recently published in a financial journal.

A New York banker and an Eastern economist expressed themselves therein, as follows: "The basic idea in this policy of keeping the rediscount rate above the market is that reserve bank money is for exceptional and unusual use - that it is not the province of a reserve bank to supply a substantial part of the ordinary funds employed in the market in ordinary times. Of course, it is expected that a reserve bank shall make money for its stockholders and shall employ such of its funds as may be necessary to meet expenses and to pay dividends. One provision of the Federal Reserve Act, permitting open market operations on the part of the Federal reserve banks, was designed to give them discretion in this matter, whether the member banks should rediscount with them or not. But the position of a reserve bank is a very peculiar one. If an ordinary bank makes a loan, checks come in against it, as a consequence of the loan, which it must meet out of its reserve unless it should happen that simultaneously new deposits are made with it of checks drawn on other banks. Loans made by a reserve bank, however, need not lead to drains on its reserve. When, in making a loan, it issues its notes or gives a deposit credit to a rediscounting bank, that note or a transfer of that deposit credit will be accepted as ultimate payment by some other institution. The deposit

liabilities of the reserve bank count as ultimate reserve for the other banks of the country, and the volume of reserve money is consequently increased through a mere increase in the deposit liabilities of the reserve bank. With an increase in the volume of reserves of the member banks, there is an immediate tendency to a reduction in the general level of discount rates throughout the country, placing them below the level which open market conditions would otherwise call for and creating a temptation for the uneconomical use of bank funds. There is particularly a temptation to use bank funds in an excessive degree for capital purposes, and for the ordinary banks of the country, misled by the artificial excess of liquid cash, to tie up too great a part of their assets in non-liquid form. The reserve bank which makes rediscount rates too low, therefore, instead of performing its function of increasing the liquidity of the banking system, tends rather to destroy liquidity."

A Chicago banker reiterates the opinion expressed by him several times that the Federal reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board ought to proceed very slowly in lowering the present rates. He anticipates that there is considerable danger, in case the rates are lowered precipitately, of a renewed inflation, with a consequent reaction more violent than the one through which we are now passing. He takes the view that in general it is a complete mistake to have the rediscount rates lower than the prevailing market rates for commercial loans, for if banks are enabled to rediscount their paper at a lower rate than they themselves receive, obviously a continued inflation is profitable to them. His opinion coincides with the views of the Eastern banker and the economist above quoted and he stresses the point that our large gold reserve is, after all, due only to the fact that gold is not being

circulated at the present moment and that much of this gold is likely to flow out of the country as soon as there is a change in the balances of trade. He concurs, also, in the view that a certain amount of the gold which the Federal reserve banks have at present is merely held, in a sense, in trust for Europe. He regards as entirely fallacious the argument made by adherents of a policy of lowering rediscount rates that such action is desirable because the reserve ratio and gold accumulations of the Federal reserve banks justify a relaxation of the official rates.

A Milwaukee banker who contends that the policy should be in accord with the money market tendency, states that "The main point made by those opposed to the lowering of Federal reserve discount rates is that the re-discount rate should always be above the market rate. This is laid down as a general principle to which there are no exceptions. Federal reserve funds are only emergency funds, it is said, and it should not be possible for banks to make a profit by rediscounting at a lower rate than the market!" He calls attention to the fact that "When the demand for credit is excessive and increasing, the reserve banks should move into a dominating position by raising their rates above the market rates for money. But the same necessity for discouraging resort to Federal reserve banks does not exist when the demand for credit slows down, loans are being paid off and reserves are accumulating. What has happened as a result of the recent lowering of rediscount rates? Has it resulted in an expansion of loans or reinflation? Not at all. On the other hand, the published records show that member banks have continued to reduce their rediscounts and borrowings and to do this have brought pressure upon their customers to liquidate. Customers who have voluntarily liquidated and got themselves back into good financial condition are offered lower rates on new loans. This, of course, is an incentive to those who have not done so to liquidate. This is the

practical way in which the leadership of the Federal reserve banks in reducing their rates has worked. There has not been the slightest tendency toward renewed inflation. Rather the tendency has been to further liquidation." This banker agrees that "The general principle of keeping Federal reserve rediscount rates above the market rate for money is sound, but it does admit of exceptions as in the present condition of things. The present Federal reserve policy is in accord with the tendency of the money market and it is hard to see how it has had or will have ^{any} but a wholesome and constructive effect. In a recent publication a well-known banker and economist has asserted that the best index of the money market in this country is the rate on line-of-credit loans to borrowers from two or more banks, and not the rate on bank acceptances, as in England. The volume of line-of-credit loans in this country is far larger than the volume of bank acceptance credits, but it may be doubted whether the rates on such loans are as competitive as bank acceptance rates. Bank acceptance rates are fixed in the open market and are published. Line-of-credit loans have no open market and there are no published rates. Line-of-credit loans are not as competitive as they may seem. A small firm commonly maintains a line of credit only at its own bank. Large corporations usually have lines of credit not only with their home banks but with large banks in financial centers, not necessarily because they can secure lower rates, but because no one bank wants to take care of their full needs. For these reasons it is to be doubted whether line-of-credit loans afford as good an index of money market tendencies as the bank acceptance rates. The latter represent the minimum rates for the best class of paper and because this is so, they indicate far beyond their actual money volume the drift of the market. The present rate on eligible bank acceptances of 5-1/8 to 5 per cent is a better indication of what is taking place and what may be expected in the open money market than rates on line-of-credit loans which reflect market condition more slowly."

Another Chicago banker takes an extremely conservative view. He would like to see many of the so-called "war amendments" to the Federal Reserve Act repealed and states that as the law stands, "nothing but the courage and wisdom of the management prevents it from becoming a disastrous engine of inflation". He objects particularly to the amendment which forces member banks to carry their entire lawful reserves in the form of collected balances with the Federal reserve banks and believes that this amendment, which he regards as practically demonetizing gold, is most dangerous in normal times. Referring to the complaints which have been made that the agricultural districts have been discriminated against, he believes that exactly the opposite is the case and appears to believe also that the Federal Reserve System has worked a great injury to the country as well as inestimable benefits. He states "In a time of inflation such as we had a year ago, it nullifies the operation of the usual normal remedies for such conditions. If it had not been for the Federal reserve banks, farmers generally would have been compelled to sell their crops a year ago and pay their debts. This would have saved them and the country from the disaster that has overtaken them. Also, had it not been for the Federal reserve banks, manufacturers and merchants would have been unable to accumulate or carry the heavy inventories entailing losses in a single year which it will take a generation to replace." He believes that "The solution to this is to keep the Federal reserve discount rates above

current market rates, so that there will be no temptation on the part of the member banks to profiteer through the Federal reserve banks. So long as the Federal reserve rates are kept below current rates, there is, in my judgment, no way in which this kind of inflation can be prevented. On the other hand, if borrowers compel their banks to rediscount in order to enable them to carry crops or goods for higher prices, they are put on notice that they are acting against the general judgment. In normal times member banks should understand that they are not expected to borrow except to meet emergencies, and they should be made to feel that borrowing at such times is an indication of weakness and needs explanation." He expresses the hope that the Federal Reserve Board will make a public statement of what its future policy will be regarding rates and expresses the belief that the confidence of the country in the Board is such that any clear statement of fundamental principles made by it would be acquiesced in.

Another New York banker while convinced that under normal conditions it is logical that the Federal reserve rate should be higher than the prevailing commercial rate, believes that in view of the world-wide conditions that exist today, the adoption, at this time, of artificial means to accelerate the process of readjustment would be a dangerous course to pursue. He states "Considering the extent to which credit for speculative purposes has been liquidated, and also taking into consideration the present reserve and gold position of the Reserve banks, it would seem that the reduction in rate is fully justified. Furthermore, I do not believe the reduction at this time in the rate will appreciably encourage a tendency toward renewed credit inflation. The question of rates has, on the whole, been ably and cour-

ageously handled by the Federal reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board." He says that if he were to offer a critical observation, it would be to remark upon the "salutary modification of the need for deflation that would have resulted had the high rates been put into effect in the spring of 1919 instead of the summer of 1920".

A Boston banker takes the view that the Federal Reserve System was organized for the purpose of furnishing credit, by means of rediscounting, to the commercial banks of the country. He says "In a general way the time when this credit is needed is just before, during and immediately after a credit crisis, or credit pinch, and it seems clear that at such time the rate charged for rediscounting should be at about the current market rate charged by the commercial banks to their customers. To make the rate higher than the prevailing rate would tend to restrict the granting of necessary credits to merchants and similar borrowers. To make the rediscount rate much lower than the prevailing rate would tend to encourage overloaning by the commercial banks. In fixing the rediscount rates, the managers of the Federal reserve banks should try, so far as possible, to keep their minds free from influences other than those which directly concern the prevailing rates of money, but they certainly are justified, when fixing the rediscount rate, in being influenced by motives of the safety of the Federal reserve banks themselves, and when the rediscounts appear to be approaching a dangerous total, they should use their rate-fixing power to check speculation and to prevent any possible danger to the Federal reserve banks, which are the foundation of our whole banking system. It was never intended and never should be intended that the Federal reserve banks consciously use their

power and authority either to encourage or to discourage business. Their chief purpose should be to assist commercial banks and to fix the rates of rediscount so as to best accomplish this, and at the same time to protect their own position from any possible overstrain." He regards as one of the greatest dangers the Federal Reserve System can be subjected to would be the attacks and manoeuvrings of politicians, in order to make the system serve political ends.

Another leading banker does not believe that the time has yet arrived when discount rates should be held up to a point above the rates for commercial paper because the conditions of business are not yet on quite a normal basis. He says that it has been the habit of commercial bankers to argue with their commercial customers that their rate, to their customers is based on the Federal reserve bank discount rate and that it should be enough higher than the discount rate so that there would be a profit to the banker between the discount rate and his rate to his customers. He says further "There is yet in our banks a large amount of so-called frozen loans which may be described as loans which are probably good but which the borrowers are not in a position to pay off at the present time. Therefore, they are not in a position to trade on market rates on an even basis with the banker. Under these conditions, a high discount rate of the Federal reserve banks simply has helped the commercial banker to get higher rates from his customers than are justified by the conditions of credit. Therefore, it was desirable and necessary for the Federal reserve banks to reduce their discount rates from 6 or 7 per cent. to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in order to inform

the commercial community that the credit situation no longer demanded these high rates." He takes the view that "Federal reserve bank discount rates should not be made with the idea of controlling business or market prices of commodities", but that "They should be indications of the effect that the present business is having on the supply of credit and of anticipated conditions that will affect the supply of credit in the near future." He believes that "When the business community has become trained to the point of watching the reserve position and discount rates of the Federal reserve banks and has come to an understanding of what these figures mean ** they will be helped very much by studying the published conditions of the Federal reserve banks and will appreciate what a change in discount rates means, provided of course that the officers and directors of the Federal reserve banks are not hampered in using their judgment in these matters by outside influences".

A Chicago merchant notes the difference of opinion among experts as to the proper time for raising or lowering the Federal reserve rediscount rates. He points out that neither the Federal Reserve System ^{nor} any part of it can be run on any formula, and that if it could very little brains would be required for that part after the formula had been found. He believes that "If we are to be a world power in commerce, as we may be, we shall have to make the New York or some other district rate attractive for the discount of the world's import and export bills. We might, of course, be above the English rate for a short time, for adjustment or other purposes, but if we make a rule

to have the rate always above the commercial paper rate in New York, our ambition to be the world's bankers, or to compete with England in commerce and finance, will vanish into thin air." He takes the view that in crises and extraordinary emergencies a Reserve bank may well be justified in violating temporarily the ordinary canons of sound finance, but emphasizes that under normal conditions and under conditions when it is possible to take a long run view, the well established traditions covering a Reserve bank's operations must be followed. The chief of these canons is that the rediscount rate of Reserve banks should be kept above the market.

The Federal Advisory Council, at its last meeting, on September 20th, expressed its belief that rates should bear a direct relation to a Federal reserve bank's reserve and to the general money market, and that in addition consideration should be given to the items enumerated in the Council's recommendation of May 17, 1921, as follows:

1. The reserves of the Federal Reserve System as a whole.
2. The reserve position of the Federal reserve bank whose rate it is contemplated to change.
3. The condition of all the banks of the country as a whole, and of the several Federal reserve districts.
4. The economic and financial condition of this country.
5. World conditions, both economic and political.
6. The eventual establishment of a credit rate policy for the Federal reserve banks by which the rediscount rate to member banks is higher than the prevailing com-

mercial rate, taking due consideration of the prevailing open market rates for various classes of loans both in this country and abroad.

7. Uniformity of rates, while at times practicable and desirable, should not be adopted as a fixed policy, the System being predicated upon the principle that varying conditions might exist in different sections of the country.

With reference to the general money market the following factors were suggested by the Board as ones which should be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to what is the current rate for money.

1. Rates charged by banks to their regular customers.
2. Rates for one-name paper bought through note brokers.
3. Open market rates on bankers acceptances, and
4. Rates on Treasury Certificates.

The Board asked the Council for its views as to the relative importance of each of these factors and the council expressed the view that all four items mentioned are important in determining the money market but there may be other factors which should likewise be given consideration, such as general business conditions and the reserve position of a Federal reserve bank. It was the view of the Council that the ruling rate for money in a district will adjust itself automatically to these conditions.

The Council expressed the view also that a Federal reserve bank while it is borrowing should not lower its rate, but states that special conditions might exist in a district which would make ^a reductions desirable and would justify such a course.

It seems clear to the Board that it is not practicable in this country for Federal reserve banks to maintain rates of discount higher than current market rates if line-of-credit loans are to be accepted as the criterion. The rates of interest permitted in many states are so high as to preclude this as a possibility. In ordinary circumstances when the credit risk is at a minimum the rates paid for high grade commercial paper sold in the open market may be regarded as a measure of the market rate for money, but it is evident that at present there is much consideration to be given to the basis on which short time obligations of the Treasury are sold and to market rates for prime bankers' acceptances. The problem, therefore, is more simple at this time in districts like New York, Chicago and Philadelphia, where the Federal reserve cities are dominant in their districts, but in other districts which cover a larger territory and where the business is more distributed and diversified, the problem is more difficult. At the present time four Federal reserve banks are rediscounting about \$46,000,000 with three other Federal reserve banks. The directors of one of these borrowing banks more than a month ago voted to reduce their discount rate from 6 per cent. to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all classes of paper, but the Federal Reserve Board has not yet approved the reduction. No evidence has been presented to show that current rates for bank accommodations are less than the Federal reserve bank rate, or that current rates would be reduced by lowering the reserve bank rate, but the directors argue that the consolidated reserve position of the system justifies a lower rate. The Board desires to have the views of members of this conference as to the advisability of permitting any Federal reserve bank to reduce its

present discount rate until its own reserves have increased to a point to make it unnecessary for it to rediscount with other Federal reserve banks.

The Board has been inclined to the view that the reserve percentage of each Federal reserve bank, as well as that of the System, should be taken into consideration as one of the determining factors in fixing the discount rate. If the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, with a reserve of around 70 per cent. and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with a reserve of 63 per cent. do not feel justified in reducing their discount rates below the present level of 6 per cent, what argument is there for a borrowing bank, like Atlanta, having a reserve without rediscounts of only 32 per cent., to have a $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. rate? On the other hand, what are the arguments against a reduction in districts which have so high a percentage of reserve?

The Board requests the members of this Conference to discuss all these questions involving principles of the discount rate frankly and fully and to report their conclusions before the close of the Conference. It seems desirable, if possible, to formulate a general policy regarding rates of discount, from which there would be no divergence except in unusual or emergency cases.